The debate is usually treated as a dispute between responsibility and irresponsibility. But there is a less discussed issue: certain forms of fair play can hinder the recovery of clubs trying to challenge those who have already consolidated their financial advantage.
There is an important difference between defending financial responsibility in football and defending rules that, however well-intentioned, may end up crystallizing the existing economic hierarchy.
This is precisely where my criticism of a conception of financial fair play quite present in the Brazilian debate comes in, including in the analyses of Mauro Cezar and in the discourse of part of the Flamengo fanbase.
My thesis is simple:
when a club's investment capacity becomes excessively linked to the revenue it can already generate, the potential effect is not just to prevent irresponsible spending. It can also make it difficult for financially weaker clubs to use capital, investors, or restructuring processes to close the gap with those already at the top.
I am not saying that Mauro Cezar wants to harm Corinthians, Vasco, Cruzeiro, Botafogo, or any other rival. That would be impossible to prove and would reduce a much more interesting economic discussion to a personal matter.
I am talking about the structural effect of a certain conception of financial fair play.
Flamengo has undergone an extraordinary financial transformation since 2013. In 2025, it reached R$ 2.089 billion in total gross revenue, the highest in Brazilian football according to a survey by Sports Value. In the same period, it recorded R$ 1.571 billion in recurring revenue and invested approximately R$ 636 million in player registration rights, according to the balance sheet reported by ge.
This does not mean that revenue is free cash. But it illustrates the financial capacity the club has built.
Once an advantage of this magnitude is consolidated, a seemingly neutral philosophy gains strength:
everyone should spend essentially what they can generate.
The principle seems fair.
The problem arises when we analyze its consequences.
If each club's investment capacity depends mainly on the revenue it already has, those in front gain an additional advantage to stay in front.
And the club that is behind receives, in practice, a simple message:
“First reach our revenue. Then you can spend like us.”
There is only one difficulty: how to reach the same revenue without first returning to sporting competition?
The Vicious Cycle of Football
In football, sporting results and financial capacity feed back into each other.
Less money tends to mean less capacity to build a competitive squad, which reduces the chances of titles, prize money, Libertadores, exposure, and commercial growth. This, in turn, further limits the revenue available to invest.
At the top, the mechanism can work in the opposite direction: more revenue allows for greater investment; greater investment increases the chances of success; success generates prize money, exposure, and additional revenue.
Sporting success can generate revenue. Revenue can generate more capacity to seek sporting success.
Therefore, when the possibility of a club using external capital to break this cycle is excessively limited, we are not just discussing financial "moralization."
We are also discussing competitive mobility.
The question becomes:
to what extent should a club that has fallen behind be allowed to accelerate its recovery?
The Problem is Not Just Theoretical
This concern appears in the economic literature on Financial Fair Play.
Peeters and Szymanski, in a paper published in Economic Policy, concluded that break-even rules could reduce wage bills and improve some financial indicators, but also strengthen the position of traditionally dominant teams. The study can be consulted at Oxford Academic.
Caglio, Laffitte, Masciandaro, and Ottaviano analyzed data from 2007/08 to 2019/20 and found improved profitability accompanied by a tilt in competitive balance in favor of top teams. The article is in the Sports Economics Review.
Another study compared 24 European leagues before and after the implementation of FFP. Seven showed a statistically significant worsening of concentration, 14 had fewer different clubs finishing in the top 4, and 13 had fewer distinct champions in the subsequent period. The work is available in Sustainability.
It is important to make a caveat: this does not prove that FFP alone caused all this concentration. The authors themselves acknowledge the existence of other factors.
The responsible conclusion is different:
there is enough evidence to take seriously the risk that certain financial rules increase sustainability and, at the same time, reduce sporting mobility.
The Fair Play That Wouldn't Hold Back Flamengo
In January 2020, Mauro published a text titled “Bad news for those who expect Financial Fair Play to hold back those who sign players”, aimed precisely at those who imagined that such a rule could slow down Flamengo.
Here a key precision is needed: the central technical explanation was from César Grafietti, then a consultant involved in the fair play project discussed by the CBF.
Grafietti explained that financially healthy clubs, like Flamengo and Palmeiras, could continue spending, while teams with deficits and high debts would have to reduce costs and go through a period of adjustment. Mauro published the interview under the framing that this represented "bad news" for those who expected fair play to hold back clubs that had built financial capacity. The text is on UOL.
Up to that point, the logic is understandable.
But it gets more interesting when the roles are reversed.
In March 2024, speaking about Corinthians, Mauro stated that under stricter financial fair play, the club would not have been able to sign Garro, Coronado, and Matheuzinho.
And he made the comparison:
fair play would not prevent Palmeiras from signing Aníbal Moreno.
It also wouldn't prevent Flamengo from signing De La Cruz.
It would prevent Corinthians from going to the market.
The statement is recorded by UOL.
His justification must also be considered: Corinthians was accumulating unpaid obligations, and Mauro argued that a club that does not correctly pay already hired professionals should not continue buying players.
It is a legitimate argument.
But there is an equally legitimate competitive consequence to be discussed:
during the period in which it reduces its spending to reorganize its finances, Corinthians tends to become even less capable of competing against clubs that already have much higher revenues.
This is the trade-off.
One Statement Summarizes the Dilemma Better Than Any Interpretation
In April 2025, while discussing whether Flamengo and Palmeiras would tend to dominate the Brazilian Championship, Mauro made a particularly interesting observation.
He argued that without fair play, a club could strengthen quickly if someone willing to put in money appeared, citing Botafogo, Atlético-MG, and Cruzeiro as examples of the unpredictability of Brazilian football.
Then he said:
“This ‘Spanishization’ would exist if there were financial fair play.”
The statement is on UOL.
It is important not to take the phrase out of context. Mauro did not present this "Spanishization" as an argument to reject fair play. On the contrary: he stated that other clubs would have to organize themselves to be able to compete.
But precisely for this reason, the statement is so relevant.
It recognizes the central trade-off:
a more rigid system can increase financial discipline, but also reduce a competitor's ability to strengthen quickly through external capital.
It is not necessary to speculate about intention.
The consequence is recognized in the debate itself.
“Financial Doping” and Clubs Trying to Accelerate
This reasoning appears in other cases.
In 2021, commenting on Atlético-MG's Brazilian title, Mauro wrote that the club had a debt of around R$ 1.3 billion and had only managed to build that squad thanks to the support of billionaire Atlético fans. He classified that type of squad building as “financial doping”. The column is on UOL.
In 2025, defending greater financial regulation, he cited Atlético-MG, Botafogo, Cruzeiro, and Corinthians as examples of projects or situations that required attention. The discussion is on UOL.
In the case of Cruzeiro, there is another relevant precision. In January 2026, Mauro published “The fan who disguises the fear of Financial Fair Play”. The formulation that "a club should only spend what it collects itself" was originally from lawyer Bruno Chatack, but Mauro reproduced the explanation and classified the posts as educational. The column is on UOL.
There is, therefore, a documented pattern of defending greater financial discipline and criticizing clubs that try to maintain or increase competitiveness while carrying significant imbalances.
But it would be unfair to stop the analysis there.
A Necessary Counterpoint: Mauro Also Criticizes Flamengo and Palmeiras
If the thesis of this article were simply "Mauro criticizes rivals and gives a pass to Flamengo," it would not survive a serious fact-check.
In August 2026, for example, Mauro criticized Flamengo and Palmeiras for paying values he considered excessive in certain signings, comparing the stance of the two clubs to that of a “snobbish nouveau riche”. The statement is on UOL.
This matters.
My criticism is not that Mauro never demands financial responsibility from Flamengo.
The thesis is different:
a certain conception of fair play can produce a distributive effect favorable to clubs that have already consolidated much higher revenues, regardless of whether its defenders also criticize these clubs when they consider they spend poorly.
This distinction makes the discussion less personal and much more interesting.
Flamengo Didn't Get Out of the Hole Just by “Spending What It Collected”
In 2013, an audit hired by Flamengo's new management pointed to a debt of approximately R$ 750.7 million.
Of this total, about R$ 394 million were tax obligations and another R$ 184 million were related to labor debts and judicial payments. The numbers were published by ge.
It is impossible to discuss Flamengo's transformation without recognizing the enormous merit of Eduardo Bandeira de Mello's administration.
The club adopted austerity, reduced indebtedness, increased revenues, strengthened marketing and commercial sectors, and developed its supporter-member program. A retrospective of this transformation was published by ge.
It was an extraordinary job.
But the story is not just about "spending what you collect."
Flamengo also renegotiated, paid in installments, and extended obligations.
Before Profut, it already used mechanisms like Refis and Timemania. In January 2013, the club itself reported having paid R$ 8 million in back taxes related to these programs, which already came from re-installments of previous debts. The note is on the official Flamengo website.
Then came Profut.
Eduardo Bandeira de Mello stated that the program allowed for the extension of almost R$ 300 million in debt for 20 years, something he classified as fundamental for Flamengo's recovery. The account is on ge.
Profut was not an exclusive benefit for Flamengo. It was a federal program established by Law 13.155/2015, available to entities that adhered to the provided conditions. The law can be consulted at Planalto.
The correct conclusion, therefore, is not that "Flamengo was saved by an exception."
Nor is it that "Flamengo simply waited and spent what it collected."
The club combined austerity, revenue growth, good management, and formal mechanisms for restructuring and extending liabilities.
And there is nothing wrong with that.
Correctly restructuring a debt is also good management.
Debt and Venture Capital Are Not the Same Thing
There is another point I consider central.
Imagine that a businessman buys a SAF and injects R$ 500 million of his own capital.
This is not economically the same as a club borrowing R$ 500 million without having a realistic capacity to pay.
In the first case, the investor provides capital and directly assumes the risk of that investment.
In the second, there is a financial obligation that can compromise future revenues and leave a liability for the club.
This does not mean that every private contribution is healthy. A club can become dependent on an owner, the controller can abandon the project, governance can be poor, and resources can be poorly used.
But these risks should be analyzed as risks inherent to a capitalization, not automatically treated as default or irresponsible indebtedness.
A serious discussion about fair play needs to separate:
- obligations and debts that the club cannot honor;
- venture capital provided by an owner or investor.
Treating these situations as economically identical is a conceptual error.
Brazilian Fair Play Already Recognizes Part of This Distinction
Here is an important correction.
If I said that the current CBF Financial Sustainability System simply prevents owners from putting money into clubs, I would be wrong.
The rules allow operational deficits to be covered by capital contributions without limitation.
Furthermore, in controlling squad costs, the limit is calculated on the sum of revenues, net transfer results, and contributions. In other words, money put in by the owner enters the base used to determine spending capacity.
This is stated in the official CBF material and in the summary published by ge.
This point is fundamental:
the current Brazilian model does not simply determine that each club can only spend the operational revenue it already possessed.
Therefore, my criticism is not that the entire CBF system is an absolute barrier to recovery.
My criticism is directed at versions of fair play, and discourses about fair play, that treat the revenue historically generated by the club as the only legitimate source of competitive capacity or all external money as "doping" by definition.
At the same time, the system provides for strong measures for clubs in situations of insolvency, such as wage freezes, transfer restrictions, revenue retention, point deductions, and even relegation.
In August 2026, for example, after Grêmio requested a collective debt payment plan, it became dependent on authorization to register new players and needed to demonstrate that it would not increase its wage bill and that purchases would be compatible with sales. The case was reported by UOL.
There is a legitimate justification for this.
A club should not stop paying one player and simply hire another.
My criticism is not against solvency, responsibility, or oversight.
It is against using the word “sustainability” as if it automatically ended a much deeper discussion about competitive mobility.
The Test the Model Needs to Face
Consider a hypothetical example.
A club earns R$ 400 million.
Its main competitor earns more than R$ 2 billion.
If both can only grow at the speed allowed by the revenue they already have, the first starts the race five times behind.
The relevant question is not whether we should allow irresponsibility.
It is:
what legitimate financial catch-up mechanisms are we willing to accept?
Can there be capital contribution from a new owner?
Can there be a temporary deficit fully covered by equity?
Can there be responsible financing for investments that increase future generation capacity?
Can there be restructuring of liabilities?
Under what conditions and with what guarantees?
These questions are more interesting than simply dividing football between those who "spend what they collect" and those who practice "financial doping."
Because if the answer is no to practically all forms of accelerating recovery, the club that is behind is left with one path:
wait.
And while it waits, those who already have billion-dollar revenues continue competing for titles, accumulating prize money, expanding commercial exposure, and reinvesting.
This is where financial sustainability can transform, even without that intention, into protection of the incumbent.
What I Really Defend
Flamengo deserves enormous credit for what it has built since 2013.
Its recovery should serve as an example for Brazilian football.
But the real story is richer than the version that the club simply accepted suffering, spent what it collected, and waited.
There was austerity.
There was professionalization.
There was an extraordinary increase in revenues.
And there was also renegotiation, installment payments, and extension of liabilities.
This does not diminish Flamengo's merit.
Correctly restructuring a debt is also good management.
Therefore, there is a huge difference between saying:
“Clubs need to pay their bills.”
and saying:
“Clubs can only grow at the speed allowed by the revenue they already have.”
The first sentence combats default.
The second, depending on the design of the rule, can protect those already at the top.
I am not defending non-payment.
I am not defending irresponsible directors.
I am not defending clubs hiring players they know they won't be able to pay.
Nor am I saying that every private contribution is healthy or that owners should be able to take unlimited risks in the name of century-old institutions.
I defend something more specific:
a truly fair system must punish default, fraud, and unsustainable indebtedness without transforming each club's historically accumulated revenue into a permanent ceiling for its sporting ambition.
It must protect creditors.
It must protect players.
It must protect the clubs themselves against irresponsible directors.
But it also needs to preserve real and responsible mechanisms of competitive mobility.
The current CBF system, by allowing contributions within its architecture, already partially recognizes this distinction.
The debate that remains is how much space should exist for a club to accelerate its approach to the leaders without putting its survival at risk.
Sustainability and competitiveness are not identical goals.
Sometimes they walk together.
Sometimes they enter into tension.
And perhaps the most important question about financial fair play is not simply:
“is the club spending what it collects?”
But rather:
“is the rule preventing irresponsibility or is it also making it unnecessarily difficult for someone to catch up with those who started ahead?”
Sources
- Caglio, Laffitte, Masciandaro & Ottaviano — “Has financial fair play changed European football?”, Sports Economics Review
- Ramchandani, Plumley, Davis & Wilson — “A Review of Competitive Balance in European Football Leagues before and after Financial Fair Play Regulations”, Sustainability
- Peeters & Szymanski — “Financial fair play in European football”, Economic Policy
- Mauro Cezar Pereira — “Má notícia para quem espera que o Fair Play Financeiro segure quem contrata” (2020)
- UOL — Mauro Cezar sobre Corinthians, Garro, Coronado, Matheuzinho, Aníbal Moreno e De La Cruz (2024)
- UOL — Mauro Cezar sobre a “espanholização” com fair play financeiro (2025)
- Mauro Cezar Pereira — Atlético-MG e “doping financeiro” (2021)
- UOL — debate sobre fair play, Botafogo, Atlético-MG, Cruzeiro e Corinthians (2025)
- Mauro Cezar Pereira — “O torcedor que disfarça o medo do Fair Play Financeiro” (2026)
- UOL — Mauro Cezar critica gastos de Flamengo e Palmeiras (2026)
- Sports Value — Finanças dos 20 principais clubes brasileiros em 2025
- ge — balanço do Flamengo de 2025
- ge — auditoria de 2013 e dívida de R$ 750,7 milhões do Flamengo
- ge — recuperação financeira do Flamengo e papel do Profut
- Flamengo — nota oficial sobre Refis e Timemania (2013)
- Lei nº 13.155/2015 — Profut
- CBF — Sistema de Sustentabilidade Financeira do futebol brasileiro
- ge — regras, limites, aportes e punições do fair play brasileiro
- UOL — restrições impostas ao Grêmio pela ANRESF em 2026
