Regarding the recent "50 BTC incident" that has drawn widespread attention, I have already stepped back from Solv's daily operations and was not involved in the BTC+ business. I was unaware of the situation when it occurred. Later, the user claiming to be the victim reached out to me, asking me to communicate with the business team. Initially, I did not fully understand why this asset had been delayed for so long, and I even questioned the team on behalf of the user. However, after learning more about the situation, I felt the issue was complex and could not be judged superficially.
After this incident sparked extensive debate online, it is reasonable for the public to want more information. Therefore, after consulting with the relevant responsible teams, and without violating confidentiality restrictions, I will share some of what I know.
Solv publicly announced a BTC+ security incident in July, which many people are already aware of. But what many do not know is that the deposit of these 50 BTC and subsequent series of operations constituted important conditions exploited by the attack path of this security incident.
Just three days after these operations, the aforementioned attack occurred. Fortunately, Solv identified and blocked the attack in time, protecting the funds of BTC+ users.
This alone does not prove a necessary connection between the two events, but it is sufficient to trigger a higher-level security review. No responsible project can directly allow redemption operations while such security risks remain unresolved. Therefore, Solv's risk control team protected this fund and required the user to explain the situation regarding this asset.
If it stopped here, the matter would not be complicated. However, during the subsequent review process, more complex situations emerged.
Please note that throughout the entire review and communication process, Solv never required this user to undergo any form of KYC, nor does it require real-name verification for ordinary BTC+ users. What this review sought to verify was whether the identity and account explanations submitted by the user were consistent, whether the relevant accounts were controlled by the individual, and whether their explanations of key operations corresponded with objective records. In other words, the question was not "who are you in reality," but "can the information you submitted to the risk control team corroborate each other and form a credible, verifiable claim of rights over this asset."
This is where the problem arose. The risk control team told me that in their subsequent communications with the user claiming to be the victim, the individual used multiple different names and online identities, stating they were all themselves. Meanwhile, their explanations regarding the use of relevant accounts and several key facts were inconsistent.
The team gave me a specific example that offers a glimpse into the broader issues.
When explaining their operations on July 18, the user claimed they acted because they saw someone else make a similar transaction. However, upon verification, the transaction they mentioned actually occurred on July 20; they could not have seen it two days in advance. They then claimed they acted based on content on the Solv official website. But the page information at the time did not include the content they claimed to see, and their explanation did not match their operation records or other contemporaneous materials.
Similar contradictions appeared in more than one place, causing the risk control triggered by the security incident to not only fail to be lifted but also raise new suspicions, forcing the risk control team to launch a deeper investigation.
The risk control team's stance is that regardless of the public pressure on X, they cannot ignore clearly triggered risks before these suspicions and risks are resolved. Security restrictions cannot be lifted. This is their professional duty and responsibility.
The above is the situation I recently confirmed with the Solv team. Since the investigation is now proceeding deeply according to standard procedures, there is much I no longer know. I personally am highly attentive to this incident and hope for a swift and satisfactory resolution.
As far as I know, Solv's risk control team has never refused to resolve the issue through proper channels such as judicial proceedings. Alternatively, if the party is unwilling to disclose their true identity directly to Solv, they can contact Solv formally through trusted agents such as lawyers.
Additionally, I personally hope that truly professional and independent security agencies will pay attention to this matter and provide independent judgments and recommendations. Solv will greatly respect such opinions.
I also take this opportunity to say a few more words. The following are my personal reflections and do not represent Solv.
During this period, many people left messages for me, including attacks, insults, and threats, which arguably reached the level of "cyberbullying." Many friends contacted me not only to ask about the incident itself but also to express concern for my mental state.
But everyone overthought it. I actually feel that this generation of Chinese crypto Twitter users has an abundance of justice, which is reassuring. I am happy to give them a thumbs up. Over the past years, regarding "cursing," I always felt the Chinese crypto community was not forceful enough, allowing fraudulent behaviors—whether blatant, assimilated, or ingenious—to profit too easily. I hope everyone continues to hate evil and apply greater pressure to those who commit fraud, which will benefit the industry's revival. This time, the spotlight turned on us. Although there are misunderstandings, it shows that the force of justice in the industry is growing.
However, facing such a complex crypto dark forest and abnormal situations, righteous Twitter users must learn to ask "why" more often.
I have always believed that Liu Cixin's novel The Three-Body Problem, beyond its sci-fi achievements, made another important contribution: creating a new catchphrase for modern Chinese—"Where something seems abnormal, there must be a trick." This phrase is especially suitable for the crypto world, where there are too many tricks. If you see something unreasonable, do not rush to conclusions. Take a step back, give yourself time to observe and think patiently, and you will avoid major mistakes.
Many Twitter users came directly to accuse Solv of embezzling, seizing, or swallowing large customer funds. I want to ask, can't you see the "abnormality"?
First, Solv is not a small project. It has been operating for six years, with its token listed on over 30 mainstream exchanges. Even in the current deep bear market, it operates normally and launches new businesses. Would such a project destroy its reputation and future for 50 BTC?
Second, saying Solv is "embezzling customer assets" deviates far from the facts. You can argue that Solv's risk control is too strict, but calling it "embezzlement"? What is embezzlement? As I understand it, this asset remains intact, visible on-chain, and has not been transferred, pledged, or disposed of. Other BTC+ users' deposits and withdrawals are normal and unaffected. Who embezzles customer assets like this? Just freezing it there, fully visible on-chain, with no transfer, mixing, expansion of scope, or pocketing by anyone—just taking abuse and making no money—is this how embezzlement works? Testing a project with a frozen fund under public supervision—which project can withstand such a test?
Third, as a six-year-old project, Solv has public cooperation relationships with numerous industry institutions. That means it must face multiple constraints from partners, users, laws, and judicial procedures. You can check the names and number of these institutions on Solv's official website. Moreover, Solv's business is not purely retail-facing (2C) but highly dependent on this cooperative network. Success and failure hinge on it. These institutions constitute strong oversight and constraint forces. If Solv swallowed customer funds, do you think these partners would tolerate it?
Fourth, Solv has been a real-name project since day one. If we really embezzled customer funds, could we run away? When Solv started, during the DeFi Summer of 2020, many anonymous projects became trendy, and some influencers argued that authentic DeFi projects should be anonymous. But we chose to operate under real names from the start to express a responsible attitude. Please have common sense: real-name projects like Solv must comply with legal requirements and judicial rulings. We are not the kind of anonymous or pseudonymous projects that can disappear into the dark forest. We cannot run, so we would not do things that sacrifice dignity for survival.
In summary, your righteous indignation is commendable, but you oversimplified the matter.
Finally, I want to say a few words to this friend. A few weeks ago, you contacted me via DM, asking me to help push things forward. Did I listen carefully? Did I pass all the materials you gave me to the team? Initially, due to lack of full understanding, I urged the team on your behalf and even questioned why they were so cautious. You know this well.
It is precisely because I learned more later that I increasingly understood why the risk control team dared not release the funds.
I think what you need to do is simple: cooperate with the risk control team to clarify the relevant facts. How hard is that?
If this asset is indeed yours and your explanations are truthful, what you should do most is not wage a public opinion war against Solv on X every day. Instead, find a lawyer and use a credible, verifiable identity that bears responsibility for statements to explain everything once and for all, rather than constantly changing versions of key facts while simplifying this complex event into "Solv withheld my 50 BTC without reason."
From what I know, this is not the fact.
Those who follow me on Twitter know that my real focus over the past year or two has been AI, RWA, and new US regulatory rules. Solv's business is not purely retail-facing but highly dependent on this cooperative network.
