“Don’t think about a Pink Elephant!” I remember this common test from growing up that proved how little control we have over our thoughts. My result was just like everyone’s: nothing less than a bright pink elephant popped into my head almost immediately. These days and perhaps forevermore, startup founders and investors are conducting the same thought experiment. But instead of imagining a whimsical creature, it’s the trillion dollar startup that no one can unsee.
Once you’ve seen that trillion dollar startups are buildable—and not just in theory, but on a venture timeline no less—it becomes nearly impossible to unsee them. And for an industry with the stated goal of pursuing the heretofore unachievable, there are many implications that are only beginning to be realized.
Two things immediately fall out. Funding across all stages reorients: Angels, seed funds, VCs, and growth investors—already conditioned to look for and apply past patterns—are type-matching it to their own image of a Trilicorn and concentrating capital only to the biggest possible swings. @PeterJ_Walker (then Head of Insights at Carta) provides some good Carta data on this trend here; his tl;dr: “higher valuations (and more $) into fewer companies = concentrated bets as an asset class”. And the best founders have adjusted quickly, too, putting aside any aspiration besides going for broke and using investor sentiment as reinforcement learning that confirms the more aspirational they are, the more funding they can attract. These ideas are most easily made ‘legible to capital’, to quote @WillManidis’ piece of the same name.
These implications aren’t necessarily a bad thing for innovation, but they are significant. The venture market quickly became extremely consensus – @nikunj writes about that a bit in his piece that…checks notes…is also called ‘legible to capital’ 🤷♂️. So if the traditional venture market no longer accommodates doubles and triples, what changes? It’s well established that the biggest winners of each era don’t start out looking quite that big. Books by mail (turned your everything store and hyperscaler), dating apps (turned foundational models), online snowboard store (turned all-in-one ecommerce software), graphics cards for gamers (hello, AI), cloud data stores… The biggest ideas on the planet don’t always come out of the gates and scream, “THIS IS GOING TO CHANGE THE WORLD.” Does trying to predict a trillion dollars from the very first meeting change what gets funded? Is anything going to change this paradigm, or have we already gone through a one-way door, and there’s no going back? [1]
I have a strong bias that anything and everything will get built if there is a demand for it—the ‘efficient market hypothesis’. But if the best, most ambitious founders are disincentivized from working on any perceived “small” idea, what will we miss? The result seems pretty apparent from today’s diaspora of successful products—rapid, repeat progress on a small number of more consensus areas where the market is clear and staring us in the face (e.g., silicon, inference, biotech/drug design, new foundational models for LLMs, coding, physical AI and video, all things prediction markets) but much less attention in others (SaaS, infrastructure, consumer, commerce) save for the brave few founders willing to toil without much funding, fanfare, and attention.
And that leads to the immediate impact of less exponential progress in these non-consensus areas. Progress won’t stop, but it might become more linear as it will take a contrarian thinker tinkering outside of the spotlight until their progress is undeniable—think OpenAI circa 2018, Alex Karp for most of the first decade of Palantir, Andrew Feldman with Cerebras, and many other such trailblazers. Innovation trudges on in these out-of-favor sectors, but it’s slower and more methodical—gated on the persistence of the stubborn few.
In the near-term, the consensus AI boom cycle in select areas continues and becomes more and more mutually reinforcing. The cycle time of progress expectations per unit of time continues to shorten (‘$0 to $100m ARR in a week!’), and collectively we maximize the potential progress from this present paradigm. That’s a good thing for now.
Eventually, two things are highly likely. Incremental progress in the consensus areas will begin to asymptote. We will squeeze as much blood as we can from the current stones. And in tandem, the fearless pioneers toiling away in obscurity will begin to be noticed. It will no longer be as crazy and reckless to join them, and more mainstream early adopters will jump on board with their time, attention and capital as the very early pioneers come to be seen as prophets. In other words, the cycle will eventually revert.
But how far away is this moment? Saddle up, cowboy. We’re still some ways off from the convergence—the moment when the current frenzied equilibrium shifts and a new cycle takes hold. Why? This brings us all the way back to the pink elephant, and the trillion dollar startups we can’t unsee. As long as the ‘meat’ of the venture market continues to progress— IPOs, large acquisitions, huge funding rounds, companies that raise up-rounds in quick succession—then it feels unlikely that the two venture markets will converge, and the out-of-favor sectors will remain, well, out of favor.
This is where we find ourselves today: funding as a downstream consequence —a self-fulfilling prophecy among us VCs for VCs—of the trillion dollar pink elephant everyone is chasing. And unless and until there’s a fundamental break in our collective belief in that pattern, nothing shifts in the near-term. Eventually, a countercase emerges from the rubble, but until then … the pedestrian double or triple is but a vestige of a bygone era.
So how are we - at Chemistry - adapting? And what’s the best advice for founders who don’t quickly become a consensus winner – should you blow it all up and start again until lightning strikes? It’s important to bear in mind that these two markets are not mutually exclusive. For instance, at Chemistry we’ve backed (pricey) consensus AI founders as well as those building in sectors as far from the heat as the dark side of the moon. And if past is prologue, there will be gems—and false gold—in both camps. But we are clearly still early to this hyper-consensus market, so timing is not irrelevant to the equation. As a result, our collective advice for founders has been to shift to the extreme poles – if you’re out of favor, prepare for life in that lane for longer than you think and make sure your business (and psyche) can survive there. And if you’re more of a consensus needle mover, that’s not a train you can get off and rest up before the final destination. In the end, future Trilicorns will have lots of different origin stories – but being blind to the reality and implications of the market is no longer a viable path.
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[1] One other shift that’s connected but I won’t cover in depth here is the slow, steady, persistent decline of the seed market. @whoisnnamdi writes about that in detail here.
Thanks to Mark Goldberg (@Mark_Goldberg_), Hunter Walk (@hunterwalk), and Rebecca Hanover (@rebeccahanover) for reading versions of this, Naomi Kurzweil (too little for X) for the topic inspiration, and Madison Sofield for the brainstorm.
